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A Gambling Paradox: Why an Origin-Neutral
"Zero-Quota" is Not a Quota Under GATS
Article XVI
Donald H.

REGAN*

In US-Gambling, the Appellate Body held that an origin-neutral prohibition on
remote gambling (which is how they mostly viewed the United States law) was "in
effect" a "zero-quota", and that such a "zero-quota" violated GATS Article XVI:2.
That holding has been widely criticized, especially for what critics refer to as the
Appellate Body's "effects test". This article argues that the Appellate Body's "in effect"
analysis is not an "effects test" and is not the real problem. The real mistake is regarding
a so-called "zero-quota" as a quota under Article XVI. That is inconsistent with the
ordinary meaning of the word "quota" in such a context; it is at odds with the object
and purpose of Article XVI; and it is likely to reduce Members' willingness to make
concessions.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In United States-Gambling,1 the Appellate Body holds, or seems to hold, that an
origin-neutral prohibition on the remote supply of gambling services is a "[numerical]
quota" that violates GATS Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c). 2 My object in this article is
to explain why that is a misinterpretation of Article XVI. I do not discuss the other
major issues in the case: whether the United States had actually made a commitment in
respect of gambling; whether the Appellate Body was right to exclude from
consideration all state laws; and the validity of the US Article XIV defense. 3 Also, to
keep this relatively short, I assume the reader is familiar with the basic facts of the case
and with the panel and Appellate Body opinions.

* William W. Bishop Jr Collegiate Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan. Email: <donregan@umich.edu>. For discussion and comments on drafts, I am grateful to Rob Howse, Markus
Krajewski, Jurgen Kurtz, John Morijn, Federico Ortino and Joost Pauwelyn.
I United States-Measures Affecting theCross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Senrices, WT/DS285/ABIR
(adopted 20 April 2005).
2 1 refer to a "[numerical] quota" because Article XVI:2(a) speaks of "numerical quotas", while XVI:2(c)
speaks of "quotas", unmodified. Whether this actually makes any difference is discussed in section II.C. below.
3 I discuss the Article XIV defense in Donald Regan, The Meaning of 'Necessary' in GATT Article XX and
GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing, World Trade Review, November 2007.
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Focus

II.

GETTING THE IssuE IN

A.

ORIGIN-NEUTRAL V. ORIGIN-SPECIFIC PROHIBITIONS

I say the Appellate Body "holds or seems to hold" that an origin-neutral
prohibition on remote gambling is a market access violation. It is difficult to be certain
just what the Appellate Body holds, because it gives no explicit attention (at least in this
part of the opinion) to a distinction that is crucial for thinking about the case-the
distinction between an origin-neutral (or facially non-discriminatory) prohibition on
remote supply and an origin-specific (or facially discriminatory) prohibition. To make
the distinction clear, and to open up the issue of its significance, consider a hypothetical
country Home. For simplicity, we assume Home has a unitary government (no subcentral governments raising federalism issues); and we also assume it allows various
forms of non-remote or face-to-face gambling, such as casino gambling. Now consider
two possible legal situations with regard to remote gambling. (A) Home prohibits all
remote supply of gambling services to consumers in Home, whether the supplier is
domestic or foreign. This is an origin-neutral prohibition on remote supply. (B) Home
prohibits remote supply of gambling services from abroad, but allows remote supply by
domestic suppliers. This is an origin-specific prohibition on remote supply. I think it
should be obvious that (A) and (B) raise different legal issues under GATS. Assuming
Home has made an unlimited commitment on cross-border supply of gambling
services, (B) is a paradigmatic violation of Article XVII. It is less clear whether (B)
violates Article XVI, but it hardly matters what we say about that, given the clear
Article XVII violation. In contrast, (A) is not a paradigmatic Article XVII violation; (A)
violates XVII only if it is found that foreign remote suppliers are "like" domestic nonremote suppliers and that foreign suppliers are treated "less favorably". Nor is (A) a
paradigmatic violation of Article XVI. I shall say more about why not later, but notice
for now that even the Gambling panel concedes that (A) is not the sort of thing the
drafters of Article XVI had before their minds. 4 My ultimate object in this article is to
explain why (A) is not a violation of Article XVI at all. But for the moment, all I am
trying to do is to get clear the logical distinction between (A) and (B), between an
5
origin-neutral prohibition and an origin-specific prohibition.
In its discussion of whether there is a market access violation, the Appellate Body
makes no explicit reference to this distinction. One can easily suggest reasons why the

4 United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Senices, WT/DS285JR
(adopted as modified by the Appellate Body Report, 20 April 2005), para. 6.331, discussed in section IV.B. below.
5 The actual Gambling case of course involves the United States, which is a federal country; and this is the
source of some of the most vexing factual issues in the case. As I explain later, it is not part of my project in this
article to say whether the overall United States scheme for regulating remote gambling did or did not amount to an
origin-neutral prohibition; I am concerned only with whether origin-neutral prohibitions violate Article XVI. But
lest the reader wonder, I regard it as clear that if the Wire Act, for example, forbids all cross-border and interstate
remote gambling but allows intra-state remote gambling, that is not origin-neutral (unless it can be argued that state
laws plug the gap by forbidding intra-state remote gambling).
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Appellate Body ignores it. First, both (A) and (B) make all cross-border supply illegal. It
is therefore very tempting, if one is trying to think in GATS terminology, to refer to
both (A) and (B) as establishing a "zero-quota on cross-border supply", and then to
frame the crucial question as whether such a "zero-quota on cross-border supply" is
illegal. Both the panel and the Appellate Body seem to approach the matter this way.
Unfortunately, proceeding this way suppresses the distinction between an originneutral prohibition on remote supply and an origin-specific prohibition, without any
analysis of whether the distinction makes a difference under Article XVI. In further
defense of the Appellate Body, it might be suggested that we already know Article XVI
does not distinguish between origin-neutral and origin-specific measures; Article XVI
clearly forbids origin-neutral quotas. True enough, but we must consider the possibility
that an outright prohibition is not a "quota" in the relevant technical sense, even
though it is undeniably tempting to refer to it as a "zero-quota" in this context. And we
must consider the possibility that even though Article XVI forbids origin-neutral
6
quotas, it does not forbid origin-neutral prohibitions.
Although the Appellate Body does not explicitly address the distinction between
ongin-neutral and origin-specific prohibitions when it is discussing whether there is a
market access violation, it is not unconscious of the distinction or wholly indifferent to
it. The Appellate Body discusses whether the US law is origin-neutral or origin-specific
in connection with the chapeau of Article XIV. It says, for example, "none of the three
federal statutes [the Wire Act, the Travel Act, the Illegal Gambling Business Act]
distinguishes, on its face, between domestic and foreign service suppliers". 7 And it is
clear that this matters to it, because it upholds the Article XIV defense except in one
particular: it rejects the defense insofar as the Interstate Horse-Racing Act may
supersede those other Acts, and it does so precisely because it views the Interstate
Horse-Racing Act as (at least possibly) facially discriminatory against foreign suppliers. 8
In other words, origin-specific prohibitions (or this particular origin-specific
prohibition) violate the chapeau of Article XIV, while origin-neutral prohibitions do
not. The fact that the Appellate Body generally upholds the Article XIV defense
confirms that it views the US law on remote gambling as for the most part originneutral.
As to whether the US law really was origin-neutral, I express no opinion; the
question is complicated and tangential to my project. My thesis in this article is not that
the US prohibition was origin-neutral and therefore did not violate Article XVI. My
6 Petros Mavroidis has argued that Article XVI does not forbid origin-neutral quotas at all, but only originspecific quotas. Highway XVI Re-Visited: The Roadfirom Non-Discriminationto Market Access in GA TS, 6 World Trade
Review 1 (2007), 1-23. Some of his arguments have considerable force, and I am not sure he is wrong. But the
conventional wisdom is that XVI forbids origin-neutral quotas, and I accept that for purposes of argument precisely
to highlight that even ifXVI does forbid origin-neutral quotas, origin-neutral prohibitions are still different.
7 US-Gambling, para. 354, cf. para. 357. In both of these paragraphs, the Appellate Body cites back to
paragraphs in its market-access discussion that notably fail to provide support for the claim of origin-neutrality; but
even so, that presumably indicates what the Appellate Body was thinking when it wrote the market-access section.
8 Ibid., para. 369.
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thesis is that fit was origin-neutral, it did not violate Article XVI. 9 The Appellate Body
appears to have believed the US prohibition was (mostly) origin-neutral, and all of the
formulations of its conclusions in the Article XVI discussion seem to apply to originneutral and origin-specific prohibitions indifferently. So the Appellate Body appears to
have held that even an origin-neutral prohibition on remote supply violates Article
XVI. If that is what it held, it was a mistake) 0
B.

WHY THE APPELLATE BODY'S "EFFECTS ANALYSIS" IS NOT THE PROBLEM

A number of other commentators have criticized the Appellate Body's finding of a
market access violation. 1 They and I share the same general objection, that the
Appellate Body's approach interferes too much with reasonable national regulation. But
to my mind, their specific criticisms have been misguided. They have complained
about an aspect of the Appellate Body's approach that is actually perfectly sound (which
means their criticisms will not be persuasive to the Appellate Body), and they have
missed the real mistake.
The Appellate Body's argument proceeds in two main stages. First, the Appellate
Body argues that a total prohibition on cross-border supply is "in effect" a "zeroquota", at least in some loose, non-technical sense. Then it argues that this "zeroquota" is a quota in the technical sense of Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c). 12 These two
stages are not hermetically sealed off from each other, but the Appellate Body plainly
recognizes that there are two distinct issues: (1) how far it can rely on the effects of a

9 Some readers may regard the US law as clearly not origin-neutral. As I said in note 5 above, I agree that if
the Wire Act, for example, forbids all cross-border and interstate remote gambling but allows intra-state remote
gambling, that is not origin-neutral (unless it can be argued that state laws plug the gap by forbidding intra-state
remote gambling). But I think the actual effect of the Wire Act-to say nothing of the relevant state laws-is less
clear than most people assume.
10Not only was it a substantive mistake for both the panel and the Appellate Body to hold that an originneutral prohibition violated Article XVI; but this mistake is arguably the reason the litigation concerning
implementation descended to something approaching farce. In the 21.5 proceeding before the panel, the United
States argued that it had brought its invalid measures into compliance even though it had made no change to its law
or administration. United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/
DS285/RW (adopted 22 May 2007), paras 6.40, 6.57, 6.94. And the panel made a "pseudo-finding" on the facially
discriminatory nature of the Wire Act, an issue it never decided the first time around, even though it acknowledged
that it had no real jurisdiction to consider an issue the Appellate Body had apparently already decided the other
way; seemingly the panel did this just in case the Appellate Body wanted to change its mind and needed some
factual
findings from the panel to point to; paras 6.118-6.123. All of this would have been avoided if in the original
proceeding the panel had felt required to find facial discrimination as the ground for the Article XVI (or better
Article XVII) violation. Sound law would lead to better-focused litigation.
n1E.g, Markus Krajewski, Playing by the Rules of the Game?, 32 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 4 (2005),
417-447; Federico Ortino, Treaty Interpretationand the WTO Appellate Body Report in US-Gambling: A Critique, 9
Journal of International Economic Law 1 (2006), 117-148;Joost Pauwelyn, Rien ne Va Plus? DistinguishingDomestic
Regulation from Market Access in GAiT and CATS, 4 World Trade Review 2 (2005), 131-170; Joel Trachtman,
Decisions of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, 16 European Journal of International Law 4 (2005),
801. 12Article XVI:2(a) speaks of "numerical quotas"; in Article XVI:2(c), the word "quotas" occurs unmodified.
It may seem that in this section I am sometimes careless about the possible distinction between "numerical quotas"
and "quotas" simpliciter. Indeed, I am careless about the distinction here, and that is a considerable expository
convenience. I explain in section II.C. below why I think the difference in language between XVI:2(a) and
XVI:2(c) does not make any real difference, at least for our purposes.
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measure for understanding the real purport of the measure, and (2) what sorts of
measure, once properly understood, actually do violate Article XVI:2. Most of the
criticism of the Appellate Body has focused on the first stage of the argument, on the
consideration of effects in understanding the purport of the measure. The critics are
worried that the Appellate Body might find, for example, that a licensing scheme for
taxi drivers that requires them to show a high level of driving competence is "in effect"
a forbidden numerical quota because it reduces the number of taxi drivers. 13 I agree this
would be a serious misinterpretation of Article XVI, but if we attend to what the
Appellate Body actually does in this first stage of the argument, there is no ground for
worry that it would misapply Article XVI in this way. The problem, in my opinion,
comes at the second stage, where the Appellate Body decides that an origin-neutral
"zero-quota" is a quota in the technical sense. But other commentators have implicitly
14
accepted this claim, or even explicitly endorsed it.
Let me explain why I do not think the Appellate Body would find that the taxi-driver
licensing scheme is "in effect" a quota. Even assuming that a stringent driving test reduces
the number of taxi drivers below what it would otherwise be, there is a big difference
between the effect of the remote gambling prohibition and the effect of the taxi-driver
licensing scheme (both origin-neutral, I assume). Consider first the gambling prohibition.
The prohibition does not name any number as the permitted number of remote suppliers,
but it does unambiguously specify precisely how many remote suppliers there can be
(zero), and we can infer this just from the face of the regulation. So it seems plausible to say
the measure is "in effect" a "zero-quota" (so long as we understand this as a claim about
what the measure amounts to, described non-technically, and not as a claim about its
ultimate legality). If we object to this use of "effects" for understanding the nature of the
gambling prohibition, we seem to be saying the gambling prohibition is not "in the form
of [a] numerical quota" just because it does not use the word "zero". But to have such a
hyper-formal criterion would invite evasion of the ban on numerical quotas. For example,
it would entail that a law saying "there shall never be more remote gambling suppliers than
are in business when this statute is adopted" is not a numerical quota, whereas it surely is
(assuming there is at least one remote supplier when the law is adopted). 15 We simply
16
cannot insist on formality to this extent.
13 This is Pauwelyn's example, in Rien ne Va Plus?, as note 11 above, at 160; it may seem a bit odd in
connection with cross-border supply, but it makes the point. Ortino's example is a licensing exam for lawyers, in
Treaty Interpretation,as note 11 above, at 141-142.
14 Ortino suggests that the issue of whether a "zero-quota" is a quota has been settled (inthe affirmative) by
over 50 years ofjurisprudence and practice under GATT. Treaty Interpretation, as note 11 above, at 134, n. 59. I
explain in note 41 below, why I think the GATT jurisprudence does not settle the issue under GATS.
15 Similarly, the Appellate Body points out, in its discussion of Article XVI:2(c), that if we say there can be no
violation without an "express reference to numbered units", that would not cover "a limitation expressed as a
percentage or described using words such as 'a majority"'. US-Gambling, para. 250.
16 To avoid any doubt on the reader's part, I would be happy to say that the gambling prohibition is
equivalent "in effect" to a law that says in terms, "there shall be zero remote suppliers of gambling". But once we
turn to the issue of legality, even that law should not be regarded as a quota in the sense of Article XVI (although I
concede that any jurisdiction that wrote its law this way would be taking foolish chances with the interpretive
process in dispute settlement). A "zero-quota" is not a quota at all, for reasons I explain in section II. below.

Copyright 2007 by Kluwer Law International. All rights reserved
No claims asserted to original government works.
HeinOnline -- 41 J. World Trade 1301 2007

1302

JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE

The taxi-driver scheme, in contrast, is not a quota, not even "in effect", because it
does not specify the number of taxi drivers. We can see this just by asking, "What is the
number? How many taxi drivers are allowed?" There is no answer. Even if the taxidriver scheme reduces the number of drivers, it does not specify how many taxi drivers
there shall be, nor does it put any upper bound on the possible number of drivers. Nor
does it refer to a specific number of drivers even indirectly, as it might by saying that
taxi licenses will be given to the top 10 percent of applicants at each administration of
the test, or that there will be at most one taxi license per 1,000 population, or whatever.
These arrangements might well be viewed as quotas "in effect", but they are still quite
different from the driving test for taxi drivers. 17 In sum, the gambling prohibition "in
effect" specifies precisely how many remote suppliers there shall be (zero), even though
it does not name a number; in contrast, the taxi-driver scheme, although it presumably
affects the number of drivers, does not specify a number, not even "in effect".
There is specific evidence in the Appellate Body's opinion that it would not regard
the taxi-driver scheme as "in effect" a quota. It says the question of whether a measure
is a numerical quota can be thought of as the question whether the measure is
"quantitative" or "qualitative" in nature. 18 The Appellate Body could not possibly
claim the taxi-driver scheme is "quantitative" as opposed to "qualitative" without
completely eradicating the distinction. The scheme affects quantity, but only as a result
of applying to individuals a qualitative test.' 9 So the Appellate Body cannot regard the
taxi-driver scheme as a quota. 20 Remember also, the Appellate Body says that although
it is appropriate to look beyond the mere form of the measure (and we have seen it is
right about that), "this is not to say that the words 'in the form of should be ignored or
replaced by the words 'that have the effect of". 21 The Appellate Body sees that there
must be some limit on the appeal to effects. Nothing in its opinion suggests to me that
it would overstep that limit when characterizing measures in terms of what they do "in
effect", if it had correct views about which measures, properly characterized, Article
XVI forbids. The problem is not in the Appellate Body's consideration of "effects".
The problem is elsewhere.

17 1 do not purport to settle here all questions about what should count as a quota. I am merely trying to
explain why requiring taxi drivers to pass a special driving test obviously does not.
18 US-Gambling, paras 225, 227, 232 (all stating that quotas are "quantitative") and especially paras 248, 250
(explicitly contrasting "quantitative" and "qualitative").
19 One might suggest, under the influence of European Community law, that the licensing scheme is "in
effect" a "quantitative restriction". And so it might be, under European law. But that is not a good model. The
European Court of'Justice has eradicated the distinction between "quantitative" and "qualitative" in this context.
But the Appellate Body (working with different treaty language, we should remember) says it does not mean to.
20 1 explain later why I think the Appellate Body misapplies the "quantitative/qualitative" distinction when it
decides that a "zero-quota" is quantitative. But I agree with it that the distinction is significant, and our present
concern is with the taxi-driver case.
21 US-Gambling, para. 232.
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"NuMERICAL QUOTAS", "QUOTAS", AND "LIMITED-SCOPE QUOTAS"

GATS Article XVI:2(a), (b), and (d) all list as one sort of forbidden measure
"numerical quotas"; Article XVI:2(c), in contrast, speaks simply of "quotas". Is there a
real difference here? I think not, at least for our purposes. There are two ways to argue
for this. One possibility is to argue that even XVI:2(c) is really about "numerical
quotas". If one agrees with the United States (and the Appellate Body's assumption for
purposes of argument) 22 that the phrase "expressed in terms of designated numerical
units in the form of quotas" is a single descriptive item, as opposed to two separate
items, then it refers only to quotas that are "expressed in terms of designated numerical
units", and it is hard to see how such a quota could fail to be a "numerical quota", at
least in effect. Indeed, one could argue from more general considerations that any
measure that is properly regarded as a "quota" must be a "numerical quota", at least in
effect. Quotas are about quantity, as the Appellate Body points out, and number is how
23
we refer to quantity.
But even though we can plausibly argue, both from the text and from general
considerations, that XVI:2(c) is about "numerical quotas", I do not propose to rely on
this argument. The reason is that ifI first claim all of XVI:2(a), (b), (c), and (d) are about
"numerical quotas" and then argue that a "zero-quota" is not a numerical quota, it
might seem that my argument depends crucially on a claim that zero is not a number. In
fact, I think one can make a good case that zero does not count as a "number" in this
context, 24 but I do not want to proceed in a way that may seem to trivialize the
argument and arouse the reader's suspicion that I am merely playing with words. I do
not need to argue that zero is not a number. The reasons why a "zero-quota" is not a
quota go much deeper than that.
So instead of assimilating XVI:2(c) to XVI:2(a), (b), and (d) by relying on the claim
that every XVI:2(c) quota is a numerical quota, I assimilate XVI:2(a), (b), and (d) to
XVI:2(c) by relying on the claim, which is unassailable in the present context, that
every numerical quota must first be a quota. And instead of arguing merely that a "zeroquota" is not a numerical quota, I argue that it is not a quota, period. If this is true, then
22 Ibid., para. 247.
23 Someone might ask what we should make of a law that says, "The Gaming Commission may license

remote gambling suppliers, but not too many." Is that a quota? Is it numerical? On the face of it, this law seems too
unspecific to count as a "measure" at all. It has no content except what it is given by the Gaming Commission's
practice. If we look at that practice, and if we find that the Gaming Commission is denying some licenses for
reasons other than just the particular qualifications of the applicant, then it seems that the practice will almost
certainly be viewable as creating either a "numerical quota" or a "monopoly" or an "exclusive supplier"
arrangement or an "economic needs test", depending on just how the Commission explains its denials. Given the
alternative possibilities just mentioned, I find it hard to imagine circumstances in which we would be inclined to
say the practice created a quota (as opposed to a monopoly, or an economic needs test, or whatever) but not a
numerical quota, not even in effect. So it still seems that any quota is a numerical quota.
24 Zero is not among the most basic set of numbers that mathematicians work with, the positive integers.
The positive integers are also known as the "counting numbers", and as I shall explain below, there is an intimate
connection between quotas and counting. It took a long time in the history of mathematics for people to start
thinking of zero as a number in the same sense as one, or two, or three; and their doing so was one step in a gradual
distancing of the notion of "number" from our everyday intuitions, which continued, of course, with negative
numbers, and irrational numbers, and imaginary numbers, and so on.
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a "zero-quota" cannot violate the relevant portion of XVI:2(a), (b), (c), or (d).
Hereafter I ignore the word "numerical", not because I have forgotten the wording of
XVI:2(a), (b), and (d), but because I think the word "numerical" makes no difference to
the present case.
One last preliminary matter about types of quotas. The panel expresses the view
that a measure can be a quota even though it is what we might call a "limited-scope"
quota: one that applies only to a certain method or methods of supplying a service, in
which these methods do not cover an entire mode of supply. 25 For example, suppose
the regulator imposes no restriction whatsoever on the supply of gambling services over
the telephone, but imposes a limit of ten on the number of suppliers who may supply
gambling services over the Internet. This limit on Internet suppliers is a "limitedscope" quota, covering only certain means of supply, but I agree with the panel that it
should be regarded as a quota forbidden by Article XVI:2(a). My reason for calling
attention to the proposition that a limited-scope quota is a quota is to point out that the
panel never states this proposition separately, but runs it together with the distinct
proposition that a "zero-quota" is a quota. For example, the panel says, in a finding that
the Appellate Body quotes and upholds:
[a prohibition on one, several or all means of delivery cross-border] is a "limitation on the
number of service suppliers in the form of numerical quotas" within the meaning of Article
XVI:2(a) because it totally prevents the use by service suppliers of one, or several or all means of
delivery that are included in mode 1.26

As I say, this passage runs together the claim that a limited-scope quota may be a
quota (which is correct) with the distinct claim that a "zero-quota" is a quota (which it
is my object to argue against). We must not allow the second claim to borrow
plausibility from association with the first.

III. WHY AN ORIGIN-NEUTRAL

"ZERo-QUOTA" Is NOT A QUOTA UNDER ARTICLE XVI

Finally, we have isolated the crucial issue: is an origin-neutral prohibition, an
origin-neutral "zero-quota", a quota under Article XVI? In arguing that an originneutral "zero-quota" is not a quota, I proceed in two stages. First, I explain why a
"zero-quota" is clearly not a paradigm case of a quota. Even the Gambling panel
acknowledges that a "zero-quota" is not the sort of measure the drafters of Article XVI
had before their minds. 27 A "zero-quota" is a borderline case of a quota at best. But if it
is a borderline case, how should we decide which side of the border it falls on? We
should ask what is the point of listing quotas among the forbidden measures in Article
25 E.g., US-Gambling, Panel, para. 6.338.
26US--Gambling, Appellate Body, para. 239, quoting Panel, para. 6.338. The Appellate Body notes that it
was not asked to review the panel's reasoning on the status of limited-scope quotas.
27US-Gambling, Panel, para. 6.331, quoted approvingly in Appellate Body, para. 234. 1 explain in section
IV.B. below why the panel's attempt to explain this on grounds other than a willingness to allow "zero-quotas" is
implausible.
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XVI-the point as revealed by consideration of the paradigm cases of quotas--and then
we should ask whether that point would be served or disserved by forbidding "zeroquotas". The Appellate Body never considers the question this way, but I think it
should have. So, the second stage of my argument is to explain why forbidding originneutral "zero-quotas" would not serve the point of Article XVI. (The case of originspecific "zero-quotas" is more complicated.) After that, I turn in Part IV to the
Appellate Body's arguments.
A.

WHY A "ZERO-QUOTA" IS NOT A PARADIGM CASE

If we are asked to imagine a quota, what sorts of example come to mind? Perhaps
an ordinance that says there shall be no more than 10,000 taxi medallions in some big
city; or a regulation that says there shall be no more than 30,000 tons of tuna taken from
a fishery in a particular year; or a law that says there shall be no more than one liquor
license for every 2,000 inhabitants in any Michigan township. These are paradigm cases
of quotas. In contrast, consider a law that makes it a crime to sell heroin. This is not, in
ordinary speech, a "zero-quota" on heroin dealers or heroin sales. Rather, it is a
prohibition. That is how we would normally refer to it. We would not even consider
referring to a prohibition as a "zero-quota", except for Antigua's attempt to shoehorn a
28
total prohibition into the categories of Article XVI:2.
In sum, we normally think of a quota as a permitted number or amount greater
than zero. This is the paradigm case. Something is allowed, or provided, or whatever,
but only up to a certain number or amount. I shall refer to this sort of quota as an "nquota" (where n > 0). A quota of one, or seven, or 43.5, or 17,000, is an n-quota. A
"quota" of zero is not an n-quota; it is a zero-quota. (I have hitherto used quotation
marks when referring to a "zero-quota", to emphasize that I did not think the word
"quota" was really apt. This has probably got a little tiresome. Hereafter I refer to both
n-quotas and zero-quotas without quotation marks.)
It may seem like a mere linguistic accident that we naturally use the word "quota"
for an n-quota but not for a zero-quota. But it is not an accident. As is so often true,
language is subtle, and it marks a fundamental difference (although a difference it is
possible to overlook) in the way n-quotas and zero-quotas function. Suppose we have a
law about remote gambling that says the Gaming Commission shall license not more
than five remote gambling providers, each of whom must meet certain basic
28 Revealingly, the claim that a prohibition is a quota seems to have been Antigua's third-line argument, after
(1) the Article XVII argument, and (2) the claim that when an unlimited market access concession has been given
in a particular mode, Article XVI:1 forbids any measure that interferes with access in that mode, without regard to
the specific categories of XVI:2. Incidentally, there is one context I can think of in which we would naturally speak
of a "zero-quota". Remember the fisheries regulation. Suppose that in successive years we have annual quotas of
30,000 tons, 17,000 tons, 23,000 tons, and then, after a weather disaster that temporarily causes a radical reduction
in stocks, the regulator directs that no fish at all shall be taken in the next year. We could naturally call this a "zeroquota" for the year. But this usage of "zero-quota" is natural only because the quota is part of an ongoing program
in which the quota varies from year to year and is usually not zero. There is no general prohibition on fishing, only
a temporary prohibition.
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qualifications with regard to freedom from criminal connections, financial soundness,
website security, and so on. This is a standard n-quota (n = 5). Universal Gambling
Amalgamated (UGA) now applies for a hcense. The Gaming Commission first
determines that UGA meets the basic qualifications. But it still does not know whether
a license should be issued. In order to know whether to issue a license, the Commission
needs to know how many licenses have already been granted. If UGA has the basic
qualifications, we cannot decide on UGA's case by looking at UGA alone; it is
necessary to look at the cumulative results of other decisions (which might of course be
the fact that no other previous decisions have been made, because UGA is the first
applicant). This is the way an n-quota works. In contrast, if we have a zero-quota on
remote gambling, which is to say, a flat prohibition, then we can always decide what to
do about UGA's application without knowing how any other case has been decided.
With a zero-quota, it is never necessary to look beyond UGA's application alone.
The reader might object that the reason we do not have to look beyond UGA's
application to apply the zero-quota is that we know how many other licenses have been
granted, at least if the law has been properly applied, namely, zero. 29 This misses the
fundamental point that we do not have to look at the results in other cases because the
results in other cases are irrelevant. But for the reader who thinks it is important that in
the case of the zero-quota we know how many other licenses have been granted, I
would point out that there is still a difference between the zero-quota and the n-quota.
Under the n-quota, the only way to know how many other licenses have been granted
is to count them. Under the zero-quota, we always know the number without
counting.
I think that this indicates the proper way to understand the "quantitative"/
"qualitative" distinction the Appellate Body advances to distinguish between quotas
("quantitative") and non-quotas ("qualitative"). In applying a true quota, such as an nquota, we cannot decide the individual case before us (at least if the applicant is
qualified) without counting the results in other cases. That is the sense in which a quota
is "quantitative"; a question about the "quantity" of particular results in the whole
ensemble of decided cases is essential to its application. By this criterion, the zero-quota
is not quantitative; it is qualitative. We can apply the zero-quota to each case entirely on
its own merits. We do not need to count; we don't need to think about quantity.
Because the zero-quota is not quantitative, it is not a quota.
The Appellate Body relies implicitly on a different construal of the quantitative/
qualitative distinction. They suggest that a zero-quota is "quantitative" because (unlike
the taxi-driver testing scheme discussed earlier) it determines a specific number of
licenses, namely zero. 30 Why is my construal of the quantitative/quahtative distinction,
on which a zero-quota is not quantitative (and hence not a quota), better than their
construal, on which it is? One reason is that my construal fits better with the ordinary
29 In what follows, I continue to assume that any zero-quota is evenhandedly applied.
30 US-Gambling, paras 227, 250.
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usage of the word "quota", which we have seen does not include a zero-quota. But
there is also an important non-linguistic reason. Even though a zero-quota does specify
a particular number, the judgment behind the adoption of the zero-quota is still
essentially qualitative. A zero-quota reflects ajudgment that the service (perhaps further
specified by mode or method) is somehow so objectionable or problematic that it
should not be allowed at all. Such a judgment is essentially qualitative. Such ajudgment
does, to be sure, logically entail what quantity should be allowed, namely zero. But still,
the fundamental judgment is qualitative (which explains, incidentally, why the zeroquota can be applied without counting). In the case of the n-quota, in contrast, where
one has decided to allow some of the service, but also to impose some limit, then one
must make an essentially quantitative judgment-how much to allow? Presumably a
number of qualitative judgments about a variety of factors will feed into this
quantitative judgment, but no qualitative judgment entails the quantitative conclusion
in the same way that the judgment that a service is too problematic to be allowed at all
entails the quantitative conclusion of a zero-quota. Setting the level of an n-quota
requires a separate, essentially quantitative, decision (which also explains why, when
one applies the n-quota, one has to count). In sum, the n-quota involves an irreducibly
quantitative element; the zero-quota does not.
What have we accomplished so far? I think we have made a strong case that an nquota is a quota, and a zero-quota is not. 3 1 But more important, we have demonstrated
conclusively that a zero-quota is not a paradigm case of a quota; it is a borderline case at
best. So it becomes necessary to ask whether the point of Article XVI is best served by
holding that a zero-quota is a quota.
B.

WHY AN ORIGIN-NEUTRAL ZERO-QUOTA IS NOT THE SORT OF MEASURE ARTICLE XVI
AIMS AT

We need to focus the issue once again. Remember my overall thesis is that an
origin-neutral prohibition, that is to say an origin-neutral zero-quota, is not a quota and
does not violate Article XVI. In the previous section, I discussed zero-quotas without
distinguishing between origin-neutral and origin-specific quotas. The arguments given
there apply equally to both kinds of quota, and I think even an origin-specific zeroquota should not be thought of as a quota and should not be held to violate Article
XVI. 32 Of course an origin-specific zero-quota is objectionable; but it is the origin31 For the reader who remembers that according to the Appellate Body, the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines say a
zero-quota is a quota, I explain in section W.A. below why the Guidelines do not actually support the Appellate
Body's position.
32 There are two minor wrinkles in the way the arguments of the previous section apply to origin-specific
zero-quotas. (1) I think it is clear that if there is no restriction on domestic suppliers, and a total prohibition (a
"zero-quota") on foreign supply, it would never occur to us to call the prohibition on foreign supply a zero-quota
inordinary speech; but if there is an n-quota, say a 5-quota, on domestic suppliers, then we just might refer to the
prohibition on foreign supply as a zero-quota. This is analogous to the case of the single-year zero-quota in a
regulated fishery (see note 28 above), where the use of the word "quota" for the single-year prohibition is
suggested only by the embedding of the prohibition in a larger scheme involving some true n-quotas. (2) The
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specificity that makes it so. An origin-specific zero-quota is a core violation of Article
XVII, and it should be dealt with under Article XVII.
But even though we did not need to distinguish between origin-neutral and
origin-specific zero-quotas in the previous section, we do need to in this section. Once
we ask whether forbidding zero-quotas would serve the same goals as forbidding nquotas (which are the paradigm case under Article XVI), we find that origin-neutral
zero-quotas and origin-specific zero-quotas are different. My main object in the rest of
this section is to explain why it would not serve the goals of Article XVI to forbid
origin-neutral zero-quotas. But I shall also explain briefly why it does serve the goals of
Article XVI to forbid origin-specific zero-quotas (even if they are better dealt with
under Article XVII). In practical effect, an origin-specific zero-quota is much more like
an n-quota, even an origin-neutral n-quota, than it is like an origin-neutral zero-quota.
So, in order to decide whether an origin-neutral zero-quota is a quota, we need to
know why n-quotas (including origin-neutral n-quotas) are forbidden by Article
XVI:2. 33 (So that I do not have to keep repeating "origin-neutral", for the remainder of
this article, when I talk about either zero-quotas or n-quotas, I shall mean originneutral zero-quotas or n-quotas, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.) The
most obvious suggestion about why n-quotas are forbidden is that they are likely to be
protectionist. 34 If there is an n-quota on remote gambling service suppliers, for
example, some firms are going to be allowed to supply remote gambling services and
some are not. How is it decided which are the lucky ones? Almost any system, from
grandfathering to a totally de novo selection process, is likely to favor local applicants.
Even if the selection is de novo and evenhanded, local suppliers are likely to have the best
current knowledge of the market, and thus to be the most likely to apply and to
succeed. Any system that cuts off free entry over time seems likely to favor locals, as
compared to a system which allows free entry and exit. The danger is that the restrictive
system will be chosen because it favors locals.
A zero-quota does not pose the same danger of protectionism. If no one is allowed
to supply gambling services remotely, then obviously there is no danger that the
selection of who gets to do it will be skewed in favor of locals. There is not even defacto
discrimination in favor of local remote suppliers. It might be argued that the total
prohibition on remote supply is designed to protect local non-remote suppliers against
competition from foreign remote suppliers. But that is just the sort of claim that should

Cont.
origin-specific zero-quota is "qualitative" in the same sense as an origin-neutral zero-quota: it does not require us
to count how many other licenses have been granted; and it specifies a number, zero (now for foreign supply), only
as a logical consequence of a purely qualitative judgent--we don't want foreign suppliers". But there is this
difference: in the case of the origin-specific zero-quota, the qualitative judgment is itself objectionable to the
general principles of the GATS and the WXTO, unlike the origin-neutral qualitative judgment, "we don't want any
remote gambling". This is why the origin-specific zero-quota is clearly illegal-but not because of its supposed

quota-ness.
33 Of course they are not "forbidden" at all if the regulating country has not scheduled the relevant sector, or
if it has scheduled relevant limitations to its concession. But Article XVI clearly disfavors n-quotas. Why?
34 Cf. Pauwelyn, Rien ne Va Plus?, as note 11 above, at 160.
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be subjected to Article XVII's national treatment analysis, to consider whether remote
and non-remote supply/suppliers are "like" services/suppliers and whether the regime
treats foreign suppliers "less favorably". A zero-quota (origin-neutral, remember)
cannot be used to protect domestic remote suppliers against foreign remote suppliers,
but that is precisely what an n-quota threatens.
The objection to n-quotas might be broader than simply a fear of protectionism.
Article XVI:2 might embody the view that n-quotas, even if they are not protectionist,
do not usually make economic sense-they are unnecessarily trade-restrictive means for
achieving whatever goals they might be aimed at. 35 I am not sure this is a more plausible
explanation of Article XVI:2. But in any event, there is still a difference here between
an n-quota and a zero-quota. The regulator that imposes an n-quota has decided that
some amount of the relevant service (in whatever mode or method is specified by the
measure, if it specifies) should be allowed. Seemingly, the service is not intrinsically
problematic. We may of course still need licensing standards and health and safety
regulations to guarantee that the service as actually provided is of the sort we regard as
not problematic. But one might claim that once such standards are in place, it will
generally be best to let the quantity supplied and the identity of the suppliers be
determined by the market. That is, there is generally no justification for a quota. In
contrast, the regulator that imposes a zero-quota has decided that the service (again, in
whatever mode or method is specified by the measure, if it specifies) is intrinsically
problematic. One cannot possibly argue that this sort of judgment is generally
36
unjustified. So the zero-quota is still different from the n-quota.
The title of Article XVI is "Market Access", so it is worth pointing out that my
arguments about why a zero-quota differs from an n-quota depend on a fundamental
difference in the way the n-quota and the zero-quota affect "market access". An nquota says that with regard to some sector/subsector/mode/means of supply (as specified
by the n-quota itself), some people will be allowed to supply that service and others will
not. It is only because the n-quota allows supply by some people but excludes others
that we worry about its being protectionist (in more than a defacto way that should be
challenged under Article XVII); and it is only because the n-quota allows supply by
some people but excludes qualified others that one might claim it is presumptively
35 Cf. Ortino, Treaty Interpretation, as note 11 above, at 142-143.
36 Rob Howse has suggested to me that a regulator that allows some of a service may still not regard that
service as "not intrinsically problematic", as I claim in the text. For example, the regulator might want to stamp out
brothels or betting-shops entirely, but knowing that if it tries it will only encourage illegal enterprises, it decides to
license and supervise a limited number. This is a good point, and it suggests a reason why Article XVI:2 may be
wrong to forbid n-quotas, at least without incorporating some "commercial purpose/non-commercial purpose"
distinction. It does not suggest any reason why Article XVI:2, either as it is presently understood, or as revised or
interpreted to deal with Howse's problem, should forbid zero-quotas. My object in this essay is not to say what an
ideal Article XVI:2 would look like. It is generally assumed that Article XVI:2 flatly forbids n-quotas, and my
object is to explain why even the best justification for that does not entail a limitation on zero-quotas. We may
possibly need an overbroad ban on n-quotas to have a bright-line rule (subject always to exculpation under Article
XIV). But there is no reason to include zero-quotas in this overbreadth; they are a bright-line category themselves
(hence easy to exclude from the ban), and the possible justifications for a formalistic ban on n-quotas do not apply
to zero-quotas at all.
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unjustified. The zero-quota, in contrast, says no one will be allowed to supply the
specified service (again, as specified by the zero-quota itself), and so it avoids these
worries about the n-quota. One obvious way to describe this distinction between the
n-quota and the zero-quota is to say that the former, but not the latter, denies some
suppliers access to an existing market. With the n-quota, there is a market in operation
for the specified service, but some people are denied access; some people are forbidden
to do the very same thing the license-holders are allowed to do. With the zero-quota,
no market in the specified service is permitted; there are no license-holders who are
allowed to do what the suppliers who object to the zero-quota want to do. So there is
37
no market that the objectors are denied access to.
So far we have been comparing n-quotas and zero-quotas. Everything we have said
about the distinction between them is confirmed if we consider the other sorts of
measure that are forbidden by Article XVI:2(a)-(d)-monopolies, exclusive service
suppliers, and economic needs tests. 38 All of these measures allow some suppliers to
operate in the specified market, and prevent other qualified suppliers from doing the
exact same thing the licensed suppliers are allowed to do. 39 They permit the market to
exist, but exclude some would-be participants. Hence they can be abused for
protectionist purposes, or they can plausibly be treated as presumptively unjustified. All
of these measures are like n-quotas, and zero-quotas are still different from all of them.
That is to say (remembering my linguistic stipulation), origin-neutral zero-quotas
are different from all of them. But notice that an origin-specific zero-quota is like an nquota and the other forbidden measures. It allows the existence of a market, which is to
be occupied only by domestic suppliers, and it forbids other, foreign, suppliers from
doing the very same thing the domestic suppliers are allowed to do. As I said before, in
practical effect, an origin-specific zero-quota is much more like an n-quota, even an
origin-neutral n-quota, than it is like an origin-neutral zero-quota.
Some readers may still feel dissatisfied with my argument that Article XVI does not
cover an origin-neutral zero-quota. If we state the argument crudely, it may seem that I
am just saying an origin-neutral zero-quota is not a quota under Article XVI because it
is not discriminatory. This may seem to blur the distinction between Article XVI and
Article XVII, or to ignore the fact that Article XVI covers non-discriminatory quotas as
37 I am suggesting that if the market is shut down completely, as by an origin-neutral zero-quota, there is no
denial of market access, because there is no market. Some readers might object that shutting down the market
completely is a denial of market access, the most extreme possible. I concede that in the abstract, either of these
ways of thinking about when there is a denial of market access might make sense. But my suggestion makes it clear,
at least, that there is a natural way to see the difference between n-quotas and zero-quotas in terms of whether they
deny market access. And in fact the arguments we have advanced about why a zero-quota does not pose the same
dangers as an n-quota are also arguments why in this context my interpretation of "market access denial" is the
better interpretation. Excluding some suppliers from a market that is permitted to exist is problematic in ways that
closing the market entirely is not.
I ignore XVI:2 (e) and (f). What I say applies to them also, mutatis mutandis, but they are not so closely
parallel as (a)-(d), and they do not speak of "quotas".
39 Logically, something called an "economic needs test" might be used to close a market entirely, but in
practice economic needs tests are always about protecting existing providers in some market against "destructive
competition" from new entrants.
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well as discriminatory quotas. Both objections are misguided. The difference between
Article XVII and Article XVI is that Article XVII requires the issue of discrimination to
be considered case by case, for each challenged measure (this is true whether the
discrimination is de jure, and easy to identify, or de facto, and more problematic). In
contrast, Article XVI, even if it is motivated by a worry about discrimination, does not
require case-by-case consideration of whether the measure is discriminatory; it
establishes a formal criterion. But with any formal criterion, it will sometimes happen
that we are confronted with a borderline case that calls for refinement of our
understanding of the criterion. Such a case is the origin-neutral zero-quota under the
"[numerical] quota" criterion. To decide what to say about the origin-neutral zeroquota, we must ask what is the underlying justification for the criterion as it applies to
the core cases, and the obvious suggestion is that the criterion is designed to forbid
measures whose form justifies a presumption of discrimination. 40 My argument has
been that there is no basis for such a presumption with regard to origin-neutral zeroquotas, so they should not be regarded as within the scope of the criterion. This does
not blur the distinction between Article XVI and Article XVII, since it remains true
that Article XVI involves a formal criterion (which we now understand better), and
Article XVII requires case-by-case consideration of discrimination. Nor does this
argument overlook the fact that Article XVI "covers non-discriminatory quotas". All
we can say about Article XVI's coverage of non-discriminatory quotas without begging
some presently relevant question is that Article XVI covers some quotas that are
formally non-discriminatory, namely, origin-neutral n-quotas. But this is consistent
both with the possibility that the underlying justification for the formal criterion is a
worry about discrimination, and with the fact that origin-neutral zero-quotas do not
41
trigger such a worry and so should not be covered.
40 We have also discussed the possibility that the formal criterion is designed to exclude measures whose form
justifies a presumption of economic irrationality in some broader way. But that possibility is not relevant to the
objections to my argument that I am now addressing.
41 We now have the background to discuss Federico Ortino's suggestion that 50 years of GATT law, under
which zero-quotas are illegal, has made it clear beyond question that a zero-quota is a quota; Ortino, Treaty
Interpretation,as note 11 above, at 134, n. 59. This seems to me wrong on two counts. Most importantly, even if we
concede for purposes of argument that a zero-quota is a quota under the GATT, that does not settle the question of
whether a zero-quota is a quota under Article XVI of the GATS. We know the same word can mean different
things in different contexts in the WTO agreements. (The classic example is the word "like", which the Appellate
Body has told us means different things in two sections as close as GATT Article 111:2 and 111:4. European
Communities-MeasuresAffecting Asbestos and Asbestos-ContainingProducts, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001,
para. 99.) And the context for the word "quota" is utterly different in the GATT and the GATS. Under GATT
Articles XI-XIII, the quotas of interest are always origin-specific. They are quotas on foreign goods, or on goods
from a particular country. But GATS Article XVI deals equally, indeed primarily, with origin-neutral quotas. (I say
"primarily" because origin-specific quotas are forbidden independently by Article XVII.) The difference between
origin-specific and origin-neutral is hugely significant when we are discussing zero-quotas, as I have explained in
the text. So even if "quota" in the GATT includes zero-quotas, that is of minimal relevance to the question of
whether an origin-neutral zero-quota is a "quota" under GATS Article XVI.
Now the other point. It may seem odd that I said we might "concede for purposes of argument" that a zeroquota is a quota under the GATT. Is not that much obvious? No, not at all. It is obvious that under GATT total
bans-that is, "zero-quotas"--on imports and exports are illegal. But to say zero-quotas are illegal is not to say they
are illegal as quotas. Both GATT Article XI:1 and XIII:1 speak specifically of "prohibitions", and zero-quotas are
prohibitions (origin-neutral or origin-specific, and possibly of limited scope, as the case may be). So zero-quotas are
illegal under GATT as the prohibitions they are; the question of whether they are illegal as quotas need never arise.
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Let me summarize quickly the arguments why an origin-neutral zero-quota is not
a quota under Article XVI.
(1) A zero-quota is not a "quota" according to the ordinary usage of that term in
ordinary circumstances.
(2) Zero-quotas are essentially qualitative, and this, in conjunction with the
Appellate Body's own premise that the crucial distinction is qualitative-versusquantitative, entails that zero-quotas are not quotas.
(3) The only apparent reasons for disfavoring n-quotas (that they can be presumed
to be protectionist or economically irrational) do not apply to origin-neutral
zero-quotas.
(4) Origin-neutral zero-quotas do not deny any supplier access to an existing
market for the precise service that supplier wants to provide.
In sum, an origin-neutral zero-quota, which is to say an origin-neutral prohibition of a
42
mode or method of supply, is not an Article XVI quota.
cont.
In contrast, GATS Article XVI does not talk about "prohibitions", which is why we find ourselves worrying about
whether a prohibition can be called a "zero-quota" and subsumed under the word "quota". The crucial issue under
GATS is simply not presented under GATT. (And of course, the reason GATT XI and XIII can talk about
prohibitions, while GATS XVI does not, is that the former are limited to origin-specific measures.) I have not gone
and looked at every GATT case that ever talked about quotas. I would be surprised to find much discussion of
"zero-quotas". The one place where we might find such talk is where a country has a scheme that allocates an
overall quota among other countries; and some country's zero-share is referred to as a "zero-quota". But that is like
the case I mentioned in note 28 above, where we call the unusual single-year ban on fishing a "zero-quota" for that
year. The use ofthe phrase "zero-quota" is parasitic on its being part of a general scheme where some years' quotas,
or some countries' quotas, are not zero. In sum, there is no reason to think that in general a zero-quota (a
prohibition) is a quota under GATT, even when it is clearly illegal.
42 Let me mention, in order to reject it, a totally different argument from mine about why the United States
remote gambling ban is not a market access violation. I think some people want to argue as follows: (a) the remote
gambling ban is a "technical standard" in the sense of Article VI:4/5; (b) Article VI:4/5 and Article XVI are mutually
exclusive; therefore, (c) the remote gambling ban does not fall under XVI. This argument seems to me misguided
both in its general strategy and in substance. As to the strategy, I agree that we should try to make sense of all the
provisions of GATS together, and I agree that that may affect the reading of individual provisions; but I think that
when it comes to questions about the scope of XVI and VI:4/5, both provisions are clearer taken on their own (if we
read them thoughtfully) than is any independendy-sourced proposition about whether they are exclusive, or
exhaustive, or whatever. So (b) in the argument above puts the cart before the horse. As to the substance, I think the
claim that the remote gambling ban is a "technical standard" in the sense of Article VI:4/5 is both mistaken and
pernicious. It is mistaken because "technical standard" must bear an analogy to "qualification requirement" and
"licensing requirement", with which it is yoked in Article VI:4/5. The ban on remote gambling is not at all like a
qualification or licensing requirement. This can be confirmed by looking at VI:4(a) and (b); the ban on remote
gambling is not about "competence and ability to supply the service" or about "ensur[ing] the quality of the service"
in any natural sense. (Cf. Panagiotis Delimatsis, Don't Gamble with GATS-The Interaction between Articles VI, XVI,
XVII, andXVIII CATS in the Light of the US--Gambling Case, 40 Journal ofWorld Trade 6 (December 2006), 10591080, at 1071, arguing that what we normally mean by a "technical standard" is a requirement that it is possible for
suppliers to meet, at least in principle, thus gaining access to the market.) Some people may also be moved by the
thought that Article VI is about "Domestic Regulation", and the remote gambling ban is a domestic regulation, so it
must be covered by VI:4/5. This is a bad inkrence. Article VI:1/2, which address "all measures of general application
affecting trade in services" arguably cover all domestic regulation (in committed sectors), but VI:4/5 explicitly
distinguish themselves by specifying a narrower category of regulation that they cover (qualification requirements,
technical standards, licensing requirements). As to why regarding the remote gambling ban as a "technical standard"
covered by VI:4/5 is not only mistaken but pernicious: that is because it would authorize the Council for Trade in
Services to adopt disciplines on regulations like the remote gambling ban under Article VI:4. There is nothing in the
neither under Article VI:4/5 nor
text to suggest this was the drafters' intention. In sum, the remote gambling ban falls
under Article XVI:2 (as we have shown in the text). Some people seem to think all domestic regulation must fall
under one or the other of these disciplines, but there is nothing in the text of the Agreement to suggest that.
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THE APPELLATE BODY'S ARGUMENTS: OF SCHEDULING GUIDELINES AND SCHEDULING

STRATEGIES

A. THE

IRRELEVANCE OF THE 1993 SCHEDULING GUIDELINES

The Appellate Body makes two arguments which we have not yet considered to
show that an origin-neutral zero-quota is a "[numerical] quota" under Article XVI:2.
The first argument relies on the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines:
[The 1993 Scheduling Guidelines] set out an example of the type of limitation that fals within
the scope of sub-paragraph (a) of Article XVI:2, ... That example is: "nationality requirements
for suppliers of services (equivalent to zero quota)". This example confirms
the view that
43
measures equivalent to a zero quota fall within the scope of Article XVI:2(a).

At this point in its opinion, the Appellate Body is not attending to the distinction

between origin-neutral zero-quotas and origin-specific zero-quotas, but we have seen
that that is a very significant distinction. And with that distinction in mind, we see that
the passage from the Guidelines tells us nothing about how to regard an origin-neutral
zero-quota. First, since the Guidelines refer to "nationality requirements for suppliers
of services", they are talking about origin-specific zero-quotas. The Appellate Body
over-generalizes when it (implicitly) reads the Guidelines to confirm that an originneutral zero-quota is a quota. Second, the Guidelines are not binding, and their
evidential significance is weakened if we reflect that both the writers and readers of the
Guidelines may have been careless about the precise basis of illegality for a sort of
measure (an origin-specific zero-quota) that is so obviously illegal (because of Article
XVII). Finally, although I disagree with the claim that even an origin-specific zeroquota is a quota, we have seen that if need be, I can accommodate that claim, because in
its practical effect the origin-specific zero-quota is actually like the measures specifically
listed in Article XVI:2, whereas the origin-neutral zero-quota is not. In sum, the
Scheduling Guidelines are beside the point.
B.

MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT SCHEDULING STRATEGIES

The Appellate Body's final argument is embodied in this passage that they quote
from the Panel Report:
Paragraph (a) [of Article XVI:21 does not foresee a "zero quota" because paragraph (a) was not
drafted to cover situations where a Member wants to maintain fil limitations. If a Member
wants to maintain a full prohibition, it is assumed that such a Member would not have scheduled
such a sector or subsector and, therefore, would not need to schedule any limitation or measures
44
pursuant to Article XVI: 2.

43 US-Gambling, para. 237, quoting 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, para. 6.
44 US-Gambling, Appellate Body, para. 234, quoting Panel, para. 6.331.

Copyright 2007 by Kluwer Law International. All rights reserved
No claims asserted to original government works.
HeinOnline -- 41 J. World Trade 1313 2007

1314

JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE

The basic problem with this argument is that it begs the question. 45 The Appellate
Body (adopting the panel's argument) is trying to explain away the fact that Article
XVI:2(a) does not seem to address an (origin-neutral) zero-quota. It explains this by
saying that a Member that wanted to have a zero-quota would not schedule the
subsector in the first place. But why not? The implicit argument seems to be that a
Member that wanted a zero-quota would not schedule the subsector because that
would prevent it having the zero-quota it wants (at least absent a specific limitation).
But that presupposes that a zero-quota is forbidden by XVI:2(a), which is the ultimate
question. So, the Appellate Body's argument begs the question.
We can try to revise the argument to avoid the question begging. Instead of saying
the Member that wants a zero-quota will not schedule the subsector because that
would prevent it having the zero-quota (which begs the question), we could say the
Member will not schedule the subsector, even if it is clear that that would not prevent
the zero-quota, because there is no positive reason to do so (or at least no nondeceptive positive reason-I assume away deception for the moment). Now the
implicit argument is that if other Members know the scheduling Member intends to
have a zero-quota, they will value the scheduling of the subsector at naught. But that is
just wrong. By scheduling gambling, Member M could be saying to the other
Members:
We all understand that even though I am scheduling gambling without limitation, I retain the
right to forbid [remote] gambling entirely, because that would not violate Articles XVI or XVII.
And for the time being I mean to forbid [remote] gambling entirely. But by scheduling
gambling, I am agreeing that ifI decide to abandon the total prohibition on [remote] gambling, I
will not replace it with an n-quota,
or discriminatory regulation, or any other measure that
46
violates Articles XVI or XVII.

This is a non-trivial commitment. It may not be all the other Members would like
to have, but it could be very much worth having, especially if the other Members
calculate that Member M will be forced by domestic political pressure to allow some
[remote] gambling in the future. In that case, M's scheduling of gambling will impose
47
real constraints on how that "some" must be allowed.
45 I pass over the fact that, as stated, the argument does not even apply to the instant case. The US measures
under review do not constitute a "full prohibition" on a sector ["Recreational, Cultural, & Sporting Services"], or
a subsector ["Other Recreational Services (except sporting)]", nor even on "Gambling" (nor even, in principle, on
cross-border supply of gambling, which might occur by mail). The US measures do no more than cut off the
principal means for one mode of supply of services in a "sub-subsector", namely cross-border supply of gambling
services. Of course we could restate the panel's argument so that it claimed a Member would refuse to schedule a
sector or subsector whenever it wanted to maintain a "full prohibition" on any particular means for a single mode
of supply in a sub-subsector. But to my mind, this greatly reduces whatever limited plausibility the panel's
argument may initially have. Waiving this point, I shall proceed in the text as if "Gambling" were a subsector and
subject to a fill prohibition, and I shall explain why the panel's argument fails even then.
46 A word of explanation for the occurrences of "[remote]" in the imagined statement in the text: the
argument works the same way with or without the limitation at certain points to remote gambling; I have inserted
the bracketed "remote"s just for verisimilitude, since it was in fact only remote gambling that the United States
proposed to eliminate entirely.
47 The text is written as ifM has a ban on [remote] gambling in place at the time it schedules gambling. That
corresponds to the facts of US-Gambling as understood by the Appellate Body. But the basic argument works the
same ifM does not currently have a ban on [remote] gambling, but wants to retain the possibility of imposing such
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As the next variant, suppose it is not clear one way or the other whether a zeroquota violates Article XVI. Now the Appellate Body's argument might be that a
Member that wants to have a total ban on [remote] gambling, and that behaves carefully
and cautiously, would not schedule gambling because of the uncertainty. As an
empirical prediction about Members' behavior this is problematic-the US behavior
that led to the Gambling case seems to be a counter-example. In such big, complicated
negotiations, there will be failures of care and caution, even on the part of the most
capable countries. But suppose we grant the empirical claim. What follows? It seems
the Appellate Body now has an argument to show that a Member that wants a zeroquota would not schedule the subsector; and that could explain why the drafters of
Article XVI:2(a) seemingly did not address zero-quotas. But there is a paradox in this
suggestion: the suggested argument depends on uncertainty about whether zero-quotas
violate Article XVI:2(a), which is recognized by the drafters; but if there is uncertainty,
that is itself a reason for the drafters of Article XVI:2(a) to address the matter more
clearly. But even waiving that point, and even if we now think we have an explanation
of why Article XVI:2(a) might not address zero-quotas even if they really should be
illegal, the explanation still does not give us any positive reason to think zero-quotas
should be illegal. And I have argued in detail in earlier sections of this essay that there is
no such reason.
This failure to suggest any positive reason for thinking zero-quotas should be
illegal is a general defect of the "scheduling strategy" arguments we are now
considering. But I have saved this observation until now because I think there is an
undercurrent in the Panel's opinion, and perhaps even to some extent in the Appellate
Body's opinion, that suggests that in the presence of uncertainty about the scope of
XVI:2(a), we should resolve the uncertainty against the regulation, because that will
favor trade. This approach of resolving uncertainty against the regulator is a bad idea in
general (among other reasons, it has no basis in the Vienna Convention approach), and
it is a particularly bad idea in the services context.
If a Member does not know exactly what might be forbidden at the boundaries of
Article XVI or Article XVII, and/or does not know exactly what it might want to do in
some subsector in the future, but if it is confident that it does not want to violate the
clear commands of Articles XVI or XVII (now or in the future), then that Member
might schedule the relevant subsector and take the chance that in the future, if it wants
to do something in an area of uncertainty that it believes is legal, it will be able to
persuade the dispute settlement tribunals of its view. But if the Member knows that any
uncertainty about the scope of Articles XVI or XVII will be resolved against it, then it
cont.
a ban in the future. As long as it is clear that a total ban would not violate Article XVI as a zero-quota, M can afford
to schedule gambling without limitation, and it may thereby be giving other Members something of value, even
though it can impose a total ban if it chooses. Incidentally, Rob Howse has suggested another sort of example. M
might offer a commitment on services which are currently excluded from the Agreement because they are supplied
"in the exercise of governmental authority", in anticipation of a possible future privatization (complete or partial).
Again, this might be of significant value to M's trading partners, even though it has no present effect.
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will not schedule the subsector. (Uncertainty about its own future desires will prevent
it from scheduling the subsector with specific limitations.) And not having scheduled
the subsector, the Member might actually end up later restricting trade in a way it
would have been willing ex ante to agree not to do. Even if it never ends up doing
anything it could not have done if it had scheduled the subsector, still the fact that it did
not schedule the subsector will have reduced the predictability of its behavior, with
consequent economic costs. In sum, it is a mistake to have a rule that gratuitously
discourages concessions. This is especially so with regard to services, where there are
still so many valuable concessions to be made. Rulings that seem to promote trade in
the short run, by reading concessions expansively, may damage trade in the longer run,
48
by discouraging concessions.
But, finally, is it not unfair for the United States to schedule gambling, with no
limitation in respect of cross-border supply, and then enforce a law that makes crossborder supply impossible? The short answer is, no, it is not unfair, if the law in question
does not violate Article XVI or XVII. There is nothing unfair in Members' pursuing
their own agendas within the limits of the treaty. Even an "unlimited commitment" in
a sector is not a commitment to allow totally untrammeled supply of services; it is a
commitment not to adopt or enforce measures that violate the specific terms of Articles
XVI or XVII (or VI). Any other view would make the listing of specific violations in
XVI:2 otiose.
Antigua may find itself disappointed if it thought all along that a zero-quota would
be illegal. But if it is Antigua that has made the wrong guess about the appropriate legal
result, it is Antigua that the decision should disappoint. Notice that in the face of
uncertainty, Antigua could have attempted to secure its expectation by asking for a
specific commitment not to have an origin-neutral zero-quota under Article XVIII.
Similarly, if worried by uncertainty, the United States could have secured its
expectation that it could have a zero-quota by entering a specific limitation on its
commitment. In sum, if either side was not prepared to take its chances on the
interpretation of unclear provisions, each side had something they could do about it.
There is one last possibility. If in the circumstances of a particular case we really
think one Member has been unfairly surprised by the effect on its trade of another
Member's measure that is legal under the Agreement, there is always the non-violation
remedy under GATS Article XXIII:3. But even if the complaining Member prevails,
the respondent Member will not be required to withdraw the measure. Presumably this
remedy will be used with circumspection, as it is under GATT XXIII:1(b). And in the
actual Gambling case, it seems very unlikely that Antigua was unfairly surprised relative
to any reasonable expectations it had in 1994.

48 Cf. Krajewski, Playing by the Rules, as note 11 above, at 437.

Copyright 2007 by Kluwer Law International. All rights reserved

No claims asserted to original government works.
HeinOnline -- 41 J. World Trade 1316 2007

A GAMBLING PARADOX

V.

1317

SUMMARY

An origin-neutral zero-quota differs both from an origin-neutral n-quota, which is
the paradigm violation of the "[numerical] quota" language of Article XVI:2(a)-(d), and
from an origin-specific zero-quota, if that is thought to violate Article XVI as well as
Article XVII. The origin-neutral zero-quota is not protectionist; it is not presumptively
economically irrational; it does not exclude anyone from an existing market in which
other suppliers are allowed to do what the excluded supplier wants to do; it is based
ultimately on a purely qualitative judgment. The argument that a Member that wants to
enforce an origin-neutral zero-quota over a whole sector/subsector would not schedule
that sector/subsector is not defensible; in appropriate circumstances it could make
perfect sense to schedule, without limitation, a sector/subsector in which one wanted to
enforce a zero-quota. Finally, there is no general unfairness in scheduling a sector/
subsector and then enforcing an origin-neutral zero-quota. For the rare case in which it
might actually seem unfair, the proper recourse is the non-violation remedy under
Article XXIII:3.
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